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Abstract
This paper advocates that some limits of the rational agent hypoth-
esis result from the improper assumption that one individual should be
modeled as a single rational agent. We model an individual composed of
two autonomous and interacting structures, conscious and unconscious.
Each agent utility form depends both on external signals and other struc-
turesactions. The perception of the signal depends on its recipient and
its grid of interpretation. We study both the static and dynamic version
of this interaction mechanism. We show that the dynamics may display
instability, depending on the structures interactionsstrength. However, if
unconscious has a strategic advantage, greater stability is reached. By ma-
nipulating other structuresgoals, the strategic agent can lead the whole
system to an equilibrium closer to its own optimum. This result shows
that some switch in the consciousobjective can appear. Behaviors that
cant be explained with a single utility can thus be rational if we add a
rational unconscious agent. Our results justify our hypothesis of a ra-
tional interacting unconscious. It supports the widening of the notion of
rationality to multi-rationnality in interaction.
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"[...] in this you should let yourself be guided not by any xed pur-
pose but mainly by intellectual curiosity and a spirit of exploration."
Hayek, Friedrich A. 1944. On Being an Economist
1 Introduction
For about a hundred years, Slutskys results1 have been consistently rejected.
Only recently did Browning and Chiappori (1998) show that individual con-
sumers do indeed solve Slutskys equations, even if this optimization is not done
consciously. This result has generally been taken as a conrmation of the ratio-
nal agent hypothesis : individuals are innitely rational, and their decisions are
those of utility-maximizing agents.
To be fair, what Browning and Chiappori results mostly show is the exis-
tence of an unconscious rationality. The shift is however easy to understand :
conscious and unconscious being part of the same individual and receiving the
same signals, it can be assumed that they are endowed with the same informa-
tion and utility, i.e. preferences, goals, actions, etc... Nothing distinguishing
them, it is logical to combine them in one rational action, i.e. the agents ac-
tion. In this respect, to demonstrate the unconscious rationality is equivalent
to proving the whole agents rationality.
Yet countless arguments and experimental facts seem to demonstrate the
agents irrationality. Allais2 and Kahneman-Tverski3 , for example, have shown
that under simple situations, agents display systematic psychological biases.
And indeed, agentsirrationality is usually attributed to psychological factors. It
is assumed that individuals are, most of the time, driven by their emotions, and,
ultimately, their unconscious. The action being irrational, so is the unconscious,
and so is the agent.
If the unconscious is indeed irrational, nothing can be said about it, and we
must reduce ourselves to sum the list of its behaviors. If we are to understand
anything about the unconscious, we have to suppose him to be, at least partly,
rational : we must endow him with all the attributes of the rational agent, in
the economic sense of the term. Besides, this is what Browning and Chiappori
results tend to prove. The question therefore is not to know whether the uncon-
scious is rational or not, but rather in what respect his rationality di¤ers from
the consciousrationality.
Note that utility optimization, possibly including some forecatings, has al-
ready successfully modeled (unconscious) automatic behavior, for example in the
motor or visual system 4 . These results conrm that economics is relevant to
explain unconscious neural processes. Yet similar models for conscious decision
making, and, more generally, non automatic processes, have been highly critized.
1See [38].
2See [2].
3See [26].
4See [35] for an overview.
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The main criticism is that they should include some unconscious phenomena.
It advocates the use of partial rationality to describe seemingly unrational, or
sudden switches in, choices.
For example, a well know anomaly is described by the following situation :
In a restaurant, a consumer can choose chicken or beef. He orders chicken. But
when the waiter suggests a third dish, sh, the consummer orders beef. This
examplify the independance of irrelevant alternatives. Some choices, even when
they may be rational, lack intelligibility.
In this paper we confront this problem by extending the range of the ra-
tional explanation. We advocate that some of the limits of the rational agent
hypothesis result from an improper assumption: the fact that one individual
should be modeled as a single rational agent. What can su¢ ce to explain au-
tomatic processes should be extended for more complex tasks. It seems natural
to postulate decision making not only involves the conscious individual but also
some rational unconscious processes.
This question has already been adressed in [31]. The author considers the
individual as a "dual agent", i.e. the result of two distinct agents, conscious
and unconscious, endowed with their own utility, goals and preferences. Impor-
tantly, although they receive the same signals from the outer world, both the
conscious and unconscious interpret these signals in di¤erent way. Their actions
are rational, but the di¤erential of information between them creates a bias in
the action of the dual agent.
However, this simple model does not explain the interactions between con-
scious and unconscious. Besides, it lacks of dynamics. One of our goals is to
remedy these weaknesses.
In order to implement this program, we will show that a cognitive uncon-
scious can rationaly modify conscious actions and representations, by inducing
changes in choices, goals, as well as systematic biases in actions. This does not
solve the above anomaly, but gives some intelligibility to seemingly irrational
an uctuating preferences and choices.
Our results justify our hypothesis of a rational interacting unconscious, and
supports the widening of the notion of rationality to multi rationality in inter-
actions.
More precisely, we model an individual, the dual agent, as composed of
several autonomous and interacting rational agents, or structures. These struc-
tures di¤er in their goals, information, and action. For the sake of simplicity,
we will rst assume two structures, the "conscious" and the "unconscious" The
rst structure schematically describes the agregate of the whole set of conscious
processes. For the ease of exposition, the second structure merely gathers the
remaining processes.
Fairly enough, this assumption, although practical in our demonstration,
could be taxed as dubious. The unconscious could be more acuretely modeled
by a set of multiple autonomous processes. Indeed, our simplifying assumption
will later be relaxed to include an arbitrary number of structures.
Besides, one could argue that the distinction between conscious and uncon-
scious is not clear cut. Unconscious contents can become conscious and vice-
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versa in a continuous ow. In this circumstances, disentangling the two could
seem articial. However, we argue in this paper that this complexity is the
mere consequence of two interacting agents, exchanging information, and im-
pacting one another The dual agent is precisely the result of this interaction
and etanglement.
The key point of our model is that each agent utility varies in time. Actually,
its form depends both on external signals and on internal ones, i.e. the other
structure actions. Moreover, each structure has its own grid of interpretation.
Therefore, each structure will interpret the same signal in its own, specic, way.
Some signals may be considered as irrelevant, and as such be disregarded by
a structure5 . Typically, we can assume that the conscious structure interprets
external signals acurately, whereas the unconscious interpretation may refer to
past or even symbolic events. The archetypal example is the psychoanalysis
view of the unconscious that may, more often than not, use condensation and
displacement.
These assumptions allow us to model reactive structures : the scene they
build is adapted to the outer world, yet is also inuenced by the other structure
reactions. In other words, each structure taylors the system of representation
of the other. It is this mutual inuence that creates the entanglement. It can
also explain the variation in goals without referring to external modications.
We study both the static and dynamic version of this entanglement mech-
anism. Considering in parallel the case of, rst, two non strategic structures,
and second, one structure having strategic advantage, we show that the dynam-
ics may display instability, depending on the structures interactionsstrength.
However, under strategic advantage, greater stability is reached. By manipu-
lating the other structures goals, the strategic agent can lead the whole system
to an equilibrium closer to its own optimum. He can do so without inducing an
over reaction from the non strategic agent.
This result shows that some switch in the consciousobjective can appear,
even in a constant environment, through this interaction mechanism. Behaviors
that cant be explained with a single utility can thus be rational if we add a
rational unconscious agent.
The paper is organized as follows : in section 2, we describe a general pattern
of interaction between various autonomous structures. Those structures inter-
act through their exchange of information. Both agents receive outer signals,
as well as inner signals that are the other structures actions. They process
these signals to produce some information. The signals may, when relevant,
activate the structure. Once activated, the structure builds a utility function
from its information, and optimizes it through its action. In section 3 we present
a static model of interaction between two structures, "conscious" and "uncon-
scious". Its simple pattern is general enough to convey the main points of section
2. The models equilibrium is studied and discussed for two cases : two non
strategic agents, and one strategic agent (unconscious) facing a non strategic
one (conscious).Section 4 generalizes the pattern of section 3 and develops a
5 In that respect, we follow the view presented in [33].
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general dynamic model of interaction between n structures. At each moment
t, the structures utility is shaped by some parameters. These parameters de-
pend on the other structure signals, i.e. actions, as well as on the external
signals6 .Section 5 applies the section 4 results to a dynamical version of section
3 model, and draws the implications of its dynamics. It shows, in particular,
how the strategic agent can shift the goal of the non strategic agent to reach
his own objective more easily. The last section concludes and present some
perspectives for further research.
2 Setup
We will rst precise our assumptions about the conscious and unconscious, as
well as their interactions as rational agents.
2.1 Hypotheses
2.1.1 Conscious and unconscious
We suppose that all human activity originates in the unconscious, in the neu-
roscientical acception of the term. More specically, we suppose the existence
of autonomous and interacting unconscious structures, endowed with a certain
degree of planication and reexion. It is the notion of "cognitive unconscious",
introduced by Kihlstrom (1987)7 . According to this notion, some unconscious
processes can show, at least to some degree, awareness. Besides, the survey [32]
for example, describes how these autonomous units are capable of coordination,
and present a pattern of metastability.
The notion of unconscious studied here is inspired by the combination of
these two approaches : the unconscious is a set of structures more or less au-
tonomous and linked one to the other. Under some conditions, part of these
structures become conscious. We call "unconscious" the structures non emerg-
ing to the conscious at a given point in time. By opposition, we call "conscious"
the set of unconscious structures having emerged to the conscious. The con-
scious can therefore be seen as a workspace directly fed by the unconscious.
As described, conscious and unconscious are, technically, merely aggregates
of sub-structures loosely linked to one another. In the following, we will set
aside this fact, and will indi¤erently qualify them as "structures". This is a
useful approximation that will not modify our results.
These structures are rational agents receiving and sending signals.
6This t at least partly with Edelmans presentation of consciousness in [10]: each structure
builds a scene at a certain time through the entrance and reentrance of external as well as
internal correlated signals.
7An account of this theory can be found in [23].
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2.1.2 Signal and structures
Both conscious and unconscious receive a continuous ow of signals originating
from the outside environment, or equivalently, from the other structure. Each
structure receives all the signals fully, and screens them according to its own
grid.
Each structure operates according to its own pattern. This pattern is a grid
of a priori characteristics, according to which the structure analyzes a signal.
Exactly in the same way as a photoelectric cell fail to react to a sound wave,
and a phone ignores a ray of light, each structure reacts to the signals it can
screen through its own pattern, and extract from these signals the inputs it
can perceive. We will call "informations" these inputs. A structure that has
managed to extract an information from a signal is said to be activated.
The information is a signal to which the structure has given a special mean-
ing, corresponding to its own operating system. The signals that will not have
been successfully processed by the structure will be fully disregarded.
Since the information is the interpretation of a signal, and not the signal
itself, the information extracted by the structure can be radically di¤erent from
the original signal.
Note that our approach is similar to the one developped in [33] where a
structure has its own grid of lecture, through which it attempts to construct
an object based on the signals it receives. Through a feed back process, it may
qualify this signal as a noise, and not activate itself.
2.1.3 Structure and utility
Conscious and unconscious are modeled as rational economic agents. This is
not unusual in neurosciences, where, for instance, the motor system of the body
is modeled as an agent minimizing a loss function according to an incoming
information8 .
Each structure has its own utility, which is a function of parameters and a
set of possible actions. Recall that the structures environment (i.e. the outer
world and other structure) send some signals that describe a situation. The
structure attempts to extract information from these signals. If it succeeds,
it will then be activated, meaning that it will adapt some parameters of its
utility according to this new information. Alternatively, if the structure does
not succeed in extracting information from the signals, it will not activated, and
its parameters will remain set to zero.
For a structure to be activated, only few parameters are su¢ cient, provided
that they are signicant enough. The parameters of an unactivated structure are
set to 0. When a structure is activated, its relevant parameters take a specic
value that quanties the information extracted from the signal. The utility thus
build will induce an action directly linked to the incoming stimulus.
8See [40] and [35] for example.
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2.2 Actions
With its signicant parameters now set to a certain value, the structure can react
to the context. The action it will take can be manifold : physical, physiological
or neuronal. It will optimize the structure utility, taking as given the value of
the parameters, as would any rational agent do.
2.2.1 The agents grid of lectures
Let us come back to the main point of this section. The information is merely
the structures interpretation of a signal. A single signal can therefore produce
di¤erent informations, depending on its recipient. This information is quantied
into parameters, the utilities true imputs. Each structure therefore perceives,
through one single signal, two di¤erent situations.
A minima, the unconscious is that part of the individual that is not conscious,
and continuously manages ones vital functions. Breathing, hunger, thirst, for
instance, .are all vital functions and that are not performed consciously by the
individual and denote the action of an unconscious agent. Although minimalist,
this conception highlights the fact that, within each and every one of us, a
hidden agent operates according to its own objectives.
That the signals of the environment should have the same meaning for him
than for the conscious may seem dubious. The unconscious dened here is char-
acterized for a large part by its intemporality. Each second, it must act and
react to maintain an equilibrium aquired in the past, and still at stake.today.
On the contrary the conscious is marked by temporality. By its intentional-
ity, the conscious can handle multiple dynamic and variable representations, to
play with memories, to project itself. We can therefore suppose that its grid of
lecture is much more exible and mobile than the one of the unconscious.
Consequently, the crucial distinction between conscious and unconscious lies
in the interpretation of the signals, and in the construction of the information.
Whereas the information of the conscious is marked by its temporality, the
information of the unconscious will be characterized by its intemporality. Given
a determined set of external signals, the unconscious has a static lecture of the
events: it continuously reacts to signals from which it systematically extracts
the same type of information. The conscious, on the contrary, extracts a wider
range of information from the signals. This gives him a more dynamic vision of
the situation, but also a more short-sighted one. The unconscious will interpret
the signals under a more permanent light.
2.2.2 Notations
To make things easier, Sj will be any structure, aggregated or not, conscious or
unconscious. Only two (agregated) structures will be considered in what follows,
the conscious and the unconscious. By convention S1 will be the conscious, and
S2 the unconscious.
Each structure, once activated, produces its own action, a1 and a2 respec-
tively. Unconscious actions emerge into consciousness: a reex, for instance,
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stemming directly from the unconscious, is perceived by the conscious, and
used as information and parameter in its utility.
These two actions are not independent : a2 is taken before a1 and, being
itself a signal, will impact S1s information. a2 will therefore be both an action
and a signal to S1.
2.2.3 Interaction between structures
Much of the structures interactions dynamics rests on the mutual perception
each structure has of the other. Whereas we may well, as individuals, be fully
aware that unconscious processes exist, this does not necessarily mean that our
conscious can actively use this information to his own advantage. To do so, he
should, rst recognize the impact of the unconscious on its behavior, and then
be able to manipulate it.
Therefore, the analysis must take into account the number of strategic agents
it involves We can distinguish three situations :
1. No strategic agent : Conscious and unconscious are unaware of each other,
and consider the information they get as an outside data.
2. Two strategic agents.: Conscious and unconscious are aware of the other,
but, having no control over it, treat its signals as any other external signal.
This will result in a Nash equilibrium, with an outcome similar to the
above case.
3. One strategic agent: One of the agents is aware of the other and can
manipulate it through its signals.
3 Static model
3.1 Setup
3.1.1 Preliminary remarks
To illustrate our point, we will apply our setup to a specic and very basic case.
In what follows, we will suppose an agent  whose utility depends positively on
meeting people. We will mesure this outcome as a variable depending on the
amount of social life  can get. By assumption, each time  can go out (signal),
he feels a sudden strain that e¤ectively limits his ability or willingness to do so.
The economic theory does not need the unconscious to explain this outcome.
It would model this sequence of facts by setting a cost to s outing. And indeed,
thats what it boils down to, eventually. Yet one may wonder how such a cost
could arise, and be rationalized. Should it be xed, or should it be reset at each
new situation in an ad hoc manner?
We will depart from this solution and assign to the unconscious agent a
utility distinct from the conscious. In s case, the unconscious has indeed
perceived the possibility to go out. However, unlike the conscious, going out
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will diminish its utility. When  goes out, an additional adverse signal is sent
to the unconscious. He will need to counterbalance it with the means at its
disposal. s strain can now be read as the optimal reaction of the unconscious
to optimize his utility, given the (bold) action of the conscious agent.
These hypotheses model how and why the cost of an action can arise. They
further give a rational explanation to a fact that would otherwise seem irrational.
More generally, they show how a utility can arise to the conscious. Under the
impulse of external signals, the structures exchange signals, that in turn model
each others utility. Here, the conscious utility has been modied by the cost
arising from the unconscious action.
This approach is in line with the neurosciences and their study of the forma-
tion and variations of conscious contents. We are all aware of what is conscious,
we are aware of our goals, yet we seldom know the origin of these goals. Our
model rationalise these facts by supposing an unconscious agent continually
shaping both our utility and reality.
3.1.2 Description of the model
Having underlined the dynamic nature of the structures interaction, let us now
detail their modelisation.
The two structures are activated by one (common) signal. Each one reacts by
sending signals perceived by the other structure. This could go on indenitely,
but to simplify the matter we will rst consider a basic, one period interaction.
With a one period horizon and no temporal dependance, solving the model
coveniently boils down to to nding its long-term equilibrium.
Over this period, S1, the conscious, extracts and plans rst. Only then does
S2, the unconscious structure, react to S1s planned action. This setup, open
to criticism, allows two concomitant actions, which satises our one period hy-
pothesis. We will later relax this assumption by introducing a delayed e¤ect in
the dynamic model.
The conscious grid of lecture and action We mentioned in section 2.1.2.
that S1, the conscious, has a "temporal" grid of lecture. It is adaptable, and
relatively exible to the present context. S1 is therefore able to read, interpret
and extract information from the signals in a relatively e¢ cient way. So that,
were it not for S2, a1 would be set to a0, up to a random error term, as is usual
for the rational agent.
S1; receives a set of signals , from which it extracts information and deduce
an action, a
1
, associated to a specic reward. This reward is a utility U1 that
is a function of a
1
and a0, the parameter describing the optimal action in the
present context.
In quantifying the information through its parameters, the structure has
infered an external context. It has associated to it a utility. The shape of this
utility depends therefore on the information a0 extracted from the signals .
For our agent  , the set of signals  is an invitation to go out. a0 would be
s optimal action, i.e. a time out, given his constraint.  knows that a
0
will
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maximize his utility, and if he is rational, he will choose a1 such that a1=a0 .
The unconscious grid of lecture and action Having an intemporal grid
of lecture, S2 interpretation of the signals can very well be poorly related to
the present context. Its reactions, however optimal in view of its own grid of
lecture, will, more often than not be inadapted to the situation.
Whereas S1 has received a signal  and considers a0 , S2 receives both the
signal  and the planned optimal action a0: It screens them through its own grid
of lecture, extracts from them an information, and parting, a utility radically
di¤erent from S1. We will call a00 S2s interpretation of a0. S2 sees a
0
0
as inducing
a loss in its utility. In the same vein, it interprets a1 as a sub-optimal action
a01, and will, as such, try to counter it.
We have dened the unconscious as chiey ensuring the agents vital func-
tions. The planned outing a
0
could, in our example, be seen as detrimental
for the metabolism. Other, deeper reasons could come into play. A past, long
forgotten experience could trigger a general fear of outings, seen as sources of
danger. Eventhough the information extracted by S2 has nothing to do with a0 ,
a0
0
will then activate the unconscious utility. This will in turn induce a reaction.
We will call a
2
the unconscious reaction to the (combined) conscious action and
external signals. This action a
2
will be meant to set a cost to limit the conscious
action, prevent him to perform a
0
, and therefore limit its action.
To go back to or example, a2 could be a sudden strain or anxiety due to
the phobia, rendering the action of  di¢ cult or impossible. Each structures
action being specied, we can now specify their respective utilities, as specied
by their interactions.
The agents utilities
The conscious utility S1 is described by the following quadratic utility :
U1 =  1
2
(a1   a0)2   a2a1 (1)
where the rst term describes S1s "own" utility, and the second is the cost
imposed by S2 to counter S1 action. Were there only S1, this second term would
disappear.
a2 is S2s reaction to S1s action. Insofar as S1 ignores the existence of S2,
S1 faces a2 without being able to precisely determine its origin. Consequently,
S1 will optimize its time out taking into account both its will to go out, and the
strain induced by actually going out.
The unconscious utility S2 remains unconscious, i.e. it does not appear
in the conscious framework. But being activated by the signal, it will send to
the conscious its own action, a2.Its utility will also be described as quadratic,
and will be written :
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U2 = Es2

  a
02
1
2
+ a2a
0
1  
a22
2

(2)
=   a
2
1
2
+ a2a1   a
2
2
2
Es2 is the expectation that characterize S2s interpretation of the signals.
S2 intends to react to a01, and will use a1 as a proxy for a
0
1:
S2 su¤ers a01, his interpretation of a1, and his own action to counter a
0
1, a2 :
every action bears its own cost. Here,   a0212   a
2
2
2 is S2s cost, both to su¤er a1
and to react to it, i.e. to produce a strain.
S2 will nonetheless gain something in the process : a2a01. This gain in S2s
utility is directly proportional to the cost it imposes on S1, a2a1. One structures
cost is the gain in utility of the other. S2 somehow discovered that the strain
diminishes the planned action. Setting    2 > 0 ensures a stable maximum
for the utility in the two variables a2 and a1.
Given this setup, and depending on the nature of the agents, two cases can
arise : either both agents are not strategic, or one of them is strategic and
manipulates the other. This would imply that one agent ignores the existence
of the other, or at least cannot counter it e¤ectively.
Both agent could be dened as strategic. However dreams, somatic disor-
ders, phobias, amply demonstrate that we are more a¤ected by our unconscious
than we would wish to be, and are condemned to take his actions as given
constraints. We therefore suppose the unconscious to be strategic, and the con-
scious to be non strategic. We will successively study the case for a non strategic
unconscious, and for a strategic one.
3.2 Interactions between agents
3.2.1 The non strategic unconscious agent
Here, structures can be seen as being non strategic, or both strategic and neu-
tralizing each other. Alternatively, they could even be unaware of each others
existence. Conscious and unconscious playing simultaneously, the situation will
result in a Nash equilibrium.
Each agent will choose its action according to its grid of lecture and given
the other action : whereas the conscious read a
0
and infers a1 for what they
truly are, the unconscious, will read a
0
and a
1
as a0
0
and a0
1
.
The equilibrium of the system is found by considering simultaneously the
two agents. Optimizing U1 yields
a1 = a0   a2
and the equilibrium is found by replacing S2 optimal response :
a2 = Es2a
0
1 = a1
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This action could as well be the answer of an automate mecanically reacting
to a01. The rational agent hypothesis does not necessarily refers to an individual,
but rather to a structure optimizing a utility. The motor system, for instance,
is well modeled by a learning rational agent9 .
Resolving the system yields the following actions:
a1 = a0   a1
a1 =
a0
1 + 
a2 =
a0
1 + 
where a(NS)1 =
a0
1+ et a
(NS)
2 =
a0
1+ are the actions of the non strategic agents.
Without the unconscious, the conscious optimal action would have been a0.
As soon as a0 is systematically missed, we can infer from this bias the presence
from the unconscious. This bias results from the di¤erential of information
between conscious and unconscious. This phenomenon has been explained in
[31]. Actually a2 results from a misreading of a1 by S2: If the unconscious had
not set Es2a
0
1 = a1, it could have given to a
0
1 its true value, 0, and would have
chosen a2 = 0. As a consequence, the conscious could have set a1 = a0. With
this in mind, we rewrite :
a1 = a0   a2
= a0   Es2a01
= a0    (Es2a01   Es1a01)
The bias between a1 and its optimum a0 is   (Es2a01   Es1a01), and is the
exact expression of a di¤erence of information between conscious and uncon-
scious.
[31] shows this action is in fact the optimal action of a single agent, the dual
agent.
This dual agent is the individual whose utility explicitely encompasses both
his conscious and unconscious utilities. As such his action is a combination of
two actions, the conscious and unconscious ones respectively, thus including the
previous bias in its action. Note that the dual agent, seen as a single individual,
has the remarkable property to produce two di¤erent forecasts for one unique
signal, revealing the combination of two interacting autonomous agents. This
notion is equivalent to this paper approach.
How could the bias be qualied? It originates in a di¤erence between per-
ceptions, that counters or shift an action. It can be psychological or physical.
Besides, it does not correspond to a seemingly rational reality, and can result
in a strain or a well-being. We will sum up these elements by stating that this
shift is an emotion.
9See [40].
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This emotion is, by denition, the result of a di¤erential of information
between conscious and unconscious. As such, it could potentially reduced to 0,
provided two identical grid of lectures.
Here, this di¤erential of information results in a loss in welfare : had the
unconscious recognized that a1 6= Es2a01, he would not have acted this way, and
the conscious would have reached a0 . The two agents utilities would be equal
to their reference value 0. Here, we rather have:
UNS1 =  
1
2
 (+ 2)
(+ 1)
2 a
2
0 < 0
UNS2 =
1
2
a20
2   
(+ 1)
2 < 0
We will compare these values to the case of the strategic agent below.
3.2.2 The strategic unconscious agent
The general setup is unchanged : S1 and S2 act simultaneously. S1 still
optimizes its utility taking as given S2s action, and set its optimal action
a1 = a0   a2. However, S2 now observes S1 and knows its optimal reaction
a1. It will take it into account and use it as a parameter to set its own action
a2.
We nd a2 by replacing a1 as a function of a2 in S2s utility, and by opti-
mizing over a2, which gives :
U2 = Es2

  a
02
1
2
+ a2a
0
1  
a22
2

=   a
2
1
2
+ a2a1   a
2
2
2
=   (a0   a2)
2
2
+ a2 (a0   a2)  a
2
2
2
The optimum is a2 =
(+)
2++1a0. We then deduce that a1 is :
a1 = a0   a2
=
1 + 
1 + 2+ 
a0
We note a(S)1 =
1+
1+2+ a0 et a
(S)
2 =
(+)
2++1a0 the agentsactions under the
strategic case.
We can check that a(S)1   a(NS)1 = 
2 
(+1)(2++1)a0 < 0 This shows that the
unconscious, by manipulating the conscious, has reached a higher equilibrium
from his perspective : compared to the previous case, the consciousaction is
reduced. Concretely, our agent  will go out even less than before.
But since a(S)2  a(NS)2 = (+)2++1a0  a01+ = a0  
2
(+1)(2++1) > 0, this results
from a stronger reaction of the unconscious than in the non strategic case.
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3.2.3 Utility comparison
We can compute the di¤erence of utilities between the strategic and non strategic
case for each agent :.
US2   UNS2 =
1
2
 
2   2 a20
(+ 1)
2
(2+  + 1)
> 0
US1   UNS1 =
1
2
 
2     4+  + 2 + 2 a20
(+ 1)
2
(2+  + 1)
2 < 0
There is a clear gain for S2 to be strategic, as well as a loss for S1 to be
manipulated. Nevertheless, the unconscious gain in utility refers, by denition,
to past situation and fully-reconstructed situation, furthermore based on biased
signals. From the social point of view, and over the long run, the conscious loss
in utility should result in a general loss for the dual agent.
4 General case and Dynamics
4.1 General setup
Let us now introduce a general dynamic model of interactions that will de-
scribe n structures (practically, n = 2) sending arbitrary signals and taking any
possible actions. It will encompass a dynamic version of the previous model.
Recall the general pattern of interaction that arised in the static example :.
- A structure Si is described by a vector of possible actions Xi (t) and a set of
parameters Pi (t). Both live in some, possibly di¤erent and innite-dimensional
spaces.
-Pi (t) is the information Si extracts from the signals and actions sent by
other structures and the outer world.
- Sis actions Xi (t) can act as signals for an other structure Si, and in turn
inuence Pj (t).
-Si utility directly depends on its actions, as well as on Pi (t). Si utility at
time t is given by, at the quadratic approximation10 :
Vi (t) =  1
2
Xti (t)AiXi (t) +X
t
i (t)BiPi (t) 
1
2
P ti (t)CiPi (t) (3)
At each point in time, the utility is fully dependent on both the outer world
and the other structures through Pi (t). Besides, the utility exhibits its specic
pattern through the matricial coe¢ cients Ai, Bi and Ci.
The form of the utility Vi (t) deserves to be emphasized : it explains why,
and how, the conscious utility evolves through time. The structures rational
choices can vary at each moment in time and evolve with its environment. But
they also, and more importantly, depend on other structuresperception of the
10 In the following, Y t (t) denotes the transpose of any vector Y (t) :
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environment. This can explain why some facts may appear important at time
t, and no longer at time t + 1. This does not necessarily occur in a seemingly
continuous manner, since the conscious is unaware of the unconscious, and is
subject to it.
Ultimately, Si optimizes at time t an intertemporal utility :
Ui (t) =
X
n0
ni Vi (t+ n)
where i is the rate of time preference and . ranges between 0 and 1. The higher
the i, the less the future is discounted by the structure.
4.2 Time schedule and information process
The interaction between structures is dynamic : there is a delay between the
moment an action is taken and the moment it is processed as an information.
Each period t is thus subdivided in two steps: rst, all structures process the
information, then all react to this information at the same time. The delay
between the information process and the action depends on each structure time
scale, and can be relatively short. For the sake of simplicity, this time scale
will be considered uniform across structures. The structures will extract the
parameters from the signals, through the information process, as mentionned
earlier.
We model our hypotheses on the parameters Pi (t) in the following way.
Pi (t) =
X
i 6=j
F i;j (t)Xj (t  1) + F i;ext (t)Pext (t)
where Pext (t) describe the external situation.
F i;j (t) and F i;ext (t) are lter matrices through which Si interprets signals of
Sj and the external signals, respectively. It models a linear information process
where information Pi (t) is reconstructed from the signals.
4.3 Non strategic agents
Let us now describe the dynamics of a system of n non strategic structures.
Here again, as in the static case, structures do not deliberately inuence one
another . Both take their parameters as given, and choose their action regardless
of its e¤ect on other structures at time t + 1. Since their is no intertemporal
constraint, each period is independent. Each structure thus optimizes Vi (t) one
period at a time, that yields the optimal action for Si :
Xi (t) = DiPi (t) = Di
0@X
i 6=j
F i;j (t)Xj (t  1) + F i;ext (t)Pext (t)
1A
with Di = A
 1
i Bi:This equation represents the dynamics for the action vector
Xi (t) for Si. It is not self-consistent, since it involves the other structures
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dynamics. To solve the dynamics for each structure, we need to stack all the
structures dynamical equations into one unique system. We introduce a vector
(X (t)) =
0@ X1 (t):::
Xn (t)
1A that encompasses all actions at time t:The previous
dynamical equations can be rewritten as:
(X (t)) =

F^ (t)

(X (t  1)) +

F^ ext (t)

Pext (t)
where

F^ (t)

and

F^ ext (t)

are the notations for the following concatenated
matrices.

F^ (t)

= i
j0@ ::: ::: :::::: DiF i;j (t) :::
::: ::: :::
1A
i=1:::n
j=1:::n
;

F^ ext (t)

=
0@ D1F i;ext (t):::
DnF
i;ext (t)
1A
To simplify the computation, we will assume that the lters F i;j (t) and
F i;ext (t) are independent of time. The solution of the system is
(X (n)) =

F^
n
(X (0)) + (Xe) (4)
Where (Xe) is the equilibrium solution given by a static situation where
(X (t)) = (X (t  1)) . We nd that (Xe) =

1 

F^
 1 
F^ ext

Pext (t).
The stability of the dynamics and its specicities will depend on F^ eigenval-
ues. Since little can be infered from the general case, we will study in greater
detail a practical example in section 5.
4.4 The unconscious as a strategic agent
Setup and information As in the static case, one structure, say Si,
among Sj with j = 1; :::; n, is strategic. For the sake of simplicity, lters
F i;j (t) and F j;ext (t) are independent of time.
For all j 6= i, the optimization problem is unchanged and leads to the optimal
response to the parameters: Xj (t) = DjPj (t) for j 6= i.
However, Si now di¤ers from others structures in its optimization.
Consider Sis intertemporal utility:
Ui (t) =
X
n0
ni Vi (t+ n)
with
Vi (t) =  1
2
Xti (t)AiXi (t) +X
t
i (t)BiPi (t) 
1
2
P ti (t)CiPi (t)
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The important point here is that Si actions Xi (t) also inuence Vi (t+ n) for
all n, through Pi (t+ n).
Actually, all periods are interdependent in the optimization problem : Xi (t)
inuences other structures parameters at time t + 1. Doing so, it impacts
Xj (t+ 1), that in turn inuences Pk (t+ 2), for k 6= j at time t+2. The process
goes on indenitely, spreading Xi (t) s e¤ects over all subsequent periods.
Si, beeing strategic, knows this. At time t, it will take all subsequent periods
into account, and, to do so, will forecast the future parameters. ESi;tO (t+ n)
will denote Sis forecast at time t of an arbitrary quantity O (t+ n ). We will
assume these forecasts to be linearly dependent on Sis information at time t .
We also assume that Si knows the whole set of information at time t, i.e. all
utility functions, external signals, past actions and lters : it knows the whole
vector of parameters (P (t)) ;the lters.F i;j (t) and F j;ext (t) and Sjs utilities11 .
Si linear forecasts of the future external parameters, given his set of in-
formation, are ESi;tPext (t+ n) = F
ext
t;t+n (P (t)). F
ext
t;t+n is thus the matrix that
expresses ESi;tPext (t+ n) as a linear function of the present information (P (t)).
ESi;tPext (t+ n) is the only forecast Si needs to build all its expectations
about the future : actions at time t+n depend on the signals received (P (t+ n))
, themselves depending on actions at t+n 1 , up until time t, where optimization
is performed. Si being rational, it is able, through the dynamic equations, to
reconstruct the whole set of future actions and parameters, provided that the
future exogenous parameters are forecasted.
s unconscious knows how his conscious works, and, provided acurate fore-
casts of future external signals, will be able to infer s conscious actions and
parameters. He will therefore be able to manipulate him.
The strategic agents optimisation To optimize Ui (t) and resolve @@Xi(t)Ui (t) =
0 requires deriving the dependence of ESi;tPi (t+ n) on Xi (t).
Appendix A shows that ESi;tPi (t+ n) is given by:
ESi;tPi (t+ n) = iM
n (P (t)) (5)
+i
nX
l=1
M l 1ESi;t (V Xi (t+ n  l) +WPext (t+ n+ 1  l))
wherei is the projection operator on Si space. Matrices and vectors (Mi;j)i=1;:::n;j=1;:::n,
(P (t)), V , W are concatenations of the structures data12 .
Each block of this concatenation is dened by :
Mj;k = F
j;k (t) (1  i;k)Dk for j 6= i
Mi;k = F
i;k (t)Dk
Vj = F
j;i (t)  ijF i;i (t)
Wj = F
j;ext (t)
11A lack of information about the parameters could be modeled. It could be done through
setting some parameters estimation to 0: However, assuming that Si fully knows (P (t)) does
not impair the generality of our results.
12See section 4.3.
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The formula 5 yields the dependence of Pi (t+ n) in the action Xi (t) :
@
@Xi (t)
ESi;t (Pi (t+ n)) = iM
n 1V
Appendix B shows that, inserting this result in Sis intertemporal optimiza-
tion problem, @@Xi(t)Ui (t) = 0 yields :
0 = i
0@X
n1
i (iM)
n 1
V (BiGi   Cii)

(M + V Gi)
n
+Mextn

(P (t))
1A
 AiXi (t) +BiPi (t)
whose solution for Si s optimal action is
Xi (t) = Gi (P (t))
where the matrix Gi satises :
Gi = Dii + ii
 1X
n=0
(iM)
n
V (BiGi   Cii)

(M + V Gi)
n+1
+Mextn+1
!
ext is the matrix that projects (P (t)) on Pext (t). Mextn is given by
Mextn =
nX
l=1
(M + V Gi)
l 1
WF extt;t+n
ext
The dening equation for Gi being matricial, it has usually to be solved nu-
merically. However, an explicit solution will be given in section 5 for a basic
example.
The dynamics of the system We have found the strategic structure
action : Xi (t) = Gi (P (t)), and we further know that the non strategic structure
choose Xj (t) = DjPj (t) for j 6= i. We can gather all these dynamical equations
in a unique concatenated system. This leads to:
(X (t)) =

F^ (t)

(X (t  1)) +

F^ ext (t)

Pext (t)
where (X (t)) =
0@ X1 (t):::
Xn (t)
1A encompasses all actions at time t and

F^ (t)

= i
j0B@ ::: ::: :::::: F^ (t)
j;k
:::
::: ::: :::
1CA
i=1:::n
j=1:::n
;

F^ ext (t)

=
0BB@

F^ ext (t)

1
:::
F^ ext (t)

n
1CCA
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with the block matrices

F^ (t)

j;k
and

F^ ext (t)

1
dened as:

F^ (t)

j;k
=
 
DiF
j;k (t)

j=1:::n;j 6=i
k=1:::n
F^ (t)

i;k
=
 
GiF
j;k (t)

k=1:::n
F^ ext (t)

j
=
 
DjF
j;ext (t)

j=1:::n;j 6=i
F^ ext (t)

i
=
 
GiF
i;ext (t)

:
The solution of this dynamical system is thus strictly similar to the previous
non strategic case. The equilibrium is obtained by setting (X (t)) = (X (t  1)),
and leads to :
(Xe) =

1 

F^ (t)
 1 
F^ ext (t)

Pext (t)
This allows to solve the system at each time t = n:
(X (n)) =

F^ (n)
n
((X (0))  (Xe)) + (Xe)
This dynamics is similar to the non strategic case. However, one major dif-
ference arises here: whereas, in the non strategic case, Sis action was based on
its own, sole parameters, Sis action is now based on the whole set of parameters
at its disposal, including those pertaining to other structures. This will have a
signicant impact on the results, as shown now.
5 A dynamic two structures model
Our general set up can be straightforwardly applied to the simple example of
section 3.
Let us consider a dynamic version of this model with n = 2 agents. Agent i
intertemporal utility is written:
Ui (t) =
X
n0
ni Vi (t+ n)
and utilities Vi (t) at time t are
V1 (t) =  1
2
(a
1
(t)  a0)2   a2 (t) a1 (t) (6)
V2 (t) =   a
2
1 (t)
2
+ a2 (t) a1 (t)  a
2
2 (t)
2
(7)
These are merely (1)and (2)with time dependent actions.
These formulas are encompassed in our general set up. Actually V1 (t) and
V2 (t) can be cast in the form 3 when we identify:
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X1 (t) = a1 (t) , X2 (t) = a2 (t)
P1 (t) =

a0
a2 (t)

, P2 (t) = a1 (t) , Pext (t) = a0
A1 = 1, B1 =
 
1  1  , C1 = 0, A2 = 1, B2 = , C2 = 
F 1;2 (t) =

0
1

, F 2;1 (t) = 1, F 1;ext (t) =

1
0

, F 2;ext (t) = 0
5.1 Non strategic agents
Applying 4 yields the dynamical system:
a1 (t)
a1 (t)

=

0  1
 0

a1 (t  1)
a2 (t  1)

+

a0
0

The equilibrium denotted by the upperscript NS is:

aNS1
aNS2

=
 a0
+1
a0
+1

.
As a consequence,the dynamics can be solved as:
a1 (n)
a2 (n)

=

0  1
 0
n
a1 (0)
a2 (0)

 

aNS1
aNS2

+

aNS1
aNS2

The equilibrium replicates the static case, and consequently yields the same
conclusions. However, the dynamics reveals an important additional result: the
equilibrium stability depends on .
When 0 <  < 1, the unconscious reaction to the conscious action is mild,
and the equilibrium is relatively quickly reached, although with some oscilla-
tions. Each agent react to others actions in a damped way, leading to a stable
equilibrium.
When  > 1, the unconscious overreacts to the conscious actions. It induces
an increasing and explosive oscillatory movement around the equilibrium, that
results in big losses for both agents : each attempt by 0s conscious to go
out will be met by a stronger unconscious reaction. The conscious will try to
counter the perceived strain, further increasing the strain. The e¤ect being
multiplicative, the strain will increase exponentially. We can assume that this
unstable dynamics will lead to a real disorder.
If, on the contrary, s unconscious propensity to react to the conscious is
smaller (0 <  < 1) the dynamics, will gradually fade away and settle down to
the equilibrium.
5.2 S2 as a strategic agent
Appendix C shows that the unconscious optimal action is:
a2 (t) = aa0 + ca1 (t  1)
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with:
a =
q 
22 + 1
2   4222 + 22   1q 
22 + 1
2   4222 + 222 +  22 + 1
c =
 
22 + 1
 q 22 + 12   4  22
2
 
22
 (C)
Whereas, in the non strategic case, S2 was reacting to a1 (t  1) only, S2
optimal action now depends on a0, S1s objective.
Why is it so? Inserting a2 (t) = aa0+ ca1 (t  1) in 6, S1s "e¤ective" utility
can now be rewritten as:
V1 (t) =  1
2
(a1 (t)  a0)2   aa0a1 (t)  [ca1 (t  1)] a1 (t)
The last term is the cost S2 imposes on S1 described in section 3.
  12 (a1 (t)  a0)2  aa0a1 (t) is a utility whose optimum is a1 (t) = a0  aa0.
S2 has clearly manipulated S1 system of representations by reducing its
optimal goal. It is now a0   aa0.
Rewriting   12 (a1 (t)  a0)2   aa0a1 (t) as   12 (a1 (t)  (a0   aa0))2 up to
an irelevant constant shows more clearly this downward shift imposed on a0.
S2 gains in this : in both utilities, a2 (t) was a cost. By shifting S1s goal, S2
reduces its own strain and in turn increases its utility.
S2s ability, as a strategic agent, to manipulate S1 through its goal is of
course inherent to the model, where actions are signals and signals modify the
other structures parameters. However, this particular example clearly shows
how a conscious rational agent representations and goals can shift over time,
under the action of the unconscious.
On top of the strain to go out, our agent  now experiences a decrease in its
preference to go out : the unconscious has succeeded in shifting his tastes.
The dynamical system is now straightforward :
a1 (t)
a2 (t)

=

0  1
c 0

a1 (t  1)
a2 (t  1)

+

a0
aa0

and ts equilibrium is given by:

aS1
aS2

=
 
(1 a)a0
c+1
(c+a)a0
c+1
!
.
A direct computation yields aS1 < a
NS
1 , a
S
2 > a
NS
2 : compared to the non
strategic case, S2 imposes an equilibrium closer to a1 = 0 . Both structures face
a higher cost a2. It is however optimal for S2, since it compensates this loss
through the reduction of a1 and a0. We will detail below the mechanism S2 uses
to reach its goal.
Given the equilibrium, the dynamics is easily solved:
a1 (n)
a2 (n)

=

0  1
c 0
n
a1 (0)
a2 (0)

 

aS1
aS2

+

aS1
aS2

(8)
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When c < 1; the system converges toward the equilibrium. Inspecting C
shows that the dynamics is converging for all values of  and , except in a
intermediate zone:
1 <  < 1
22
and
p
 >  >
(22+1)
(1+22)
: by manipulating S1, S2 stabilizes the
dynamics.
When  and thus  are lower than 1, the non strategic mechanism remains.
The unconscious underreacts to the conscious actions, quickly converging toward
the equilibrium.
When  > 1
22
the unconscious overeacts but, since a is large enough; S2 will
successfully manipulate S1s goal. The larger , the more a0   aa0; S01s goal,
will be reduced. This goal having now shifted close to 0, S1s incentive to react
is reduced. The equilibrium is reached and stable.
Only in the intermediate zone does S2s overreaction fail to reduce S1s
goal. S1 reacts in turn, which triggers an explosive dynamics. It may seem
surprising that the strategic S2 could induce a suboptimal outcome in the long
run. However, one should recall that at time t, S2 optimizes a discounted sum
of utilities.The discount rate is 2. The dynamics is explosive because S2, at
least partly, disregard the future13 .
5.3 Utility comparison
The utilities at time t, in the equilibrium for both situations can be compared.
Denoting NS and S the non strategic and strategic agent respectively, in the
non strategic case, we nd that:
(1  1)UNS1 =  
1
2

a0
1 + 
  a0
2
  

a0
1 + 
2
=  1
2
 (+ 2)
(+ 1)
2 a
2
0 < 0
(1  2)UNS2 =  

a0
1+
2
2
+
2

a0
1+
2
2
=
1
2
a20
2   
(+ 1)
2 < 0
and in the strategic case:.
(1  1)US1 =  
1
2
 
+ 222 + 
2
2 + 2
  
+ 22
 
+ 22 + 
2
2 + 1
2 a20
(1  2)US2 =  
 
   2  42 + 222 + 1
2242 + 4
222 + 2
2 + 442 + 4
2
2 + 4
2
2 + 4+ 2
242 + 4
2
2 + 2
a20
The di¤erence in utility is therefore :
13The intertemporal utility is
X
n0 
n
2V2 (t+ n). 8 shows that the variables and V2 (t+ n)
behave as c
n
2 with c > 1. We can show that c < 1
2
. Therefore, n2V2 (t+ n) behaves as 
n
2
2
: the intertemporal utility converges.
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(1  1)
 
US1   UNS1

=
1
2
22
 
2    2+ 222 + 222 + 22 + 2
(+ 1)
2  
+ 22 + 
2
2 + 1
2 a20 < 0
(1  2)
 
US2   UNS2

=
1
2
22
 
2   2  2+ 22 + 2  22
(+ 1)
2  
+ 22 + 
2
2 + 1
2 a20 > 0
As expected, there is a gain of utility for S2 to be strategic. This, of course,
occurs at the expense of S1 whose actions and goals have been distorted.
For the conscious, this loss in utility may well remain unnoticed : an external
witness would observe it, but as long as s preferences have been shifted, there
no reason why he should bother. Only by keeping in mind the past objective
will  realize that a shift has indeed occured, as well as a loss.
6 Conclusion
We modeled the "irrational" behavior of a single conscious agent, such as sys-
tematic bias, sudden changes in the preferences, by introducing interactions
between two rational agents, the "conscious" and "unconscious" .
This model has several distinctive features : First, each agents utility func-
tion is a function of other agentsactions through some costs. Second, a strategic
agent can, to some extent, modify the others goal. The "conscious" can there-
fore experiment a switch in his representations, directly leading him to reduce
his objective, and in turn reducing the cost of the "unconscious"own action.
This result sheds a di¤erent light on the agent rationality debate. A model
with a single agent can hardly explain why goals can endogeneously change
through time or why some systematic bias appear in actions . In our setup,
these change and bias are the consequence of an interaction : an external signal
induces a conscious behavior, such as utility formation, information process,
planning...The unconscious uses its own grid of interpretation to react both to
the outer world and to the conscious action. Doing so, it induces a change in
the consciousperception of reality, such as a change in costs, or goals. This
could explain why seemingly irrational or inconsistent reactions appear through
time. It is the result of the manipulation of the conscious goals by a strategic
unconscious. Moreover, We have shown that the systematic bias between the
conscious actions and objectives reveals the di¤erence in the two agents in-
formation processes. [31] advocates that emotions, associated to a welfare loss,
are the sign of this di¤erential of information. If the unconscious is invisible,
and, like a blackhole, reveals itself through its manifestations, then emotions
could provide a practical way to explore and interpret the unconsciousgrid of
interpretation.
We can now take a di¤erent look at the independance of irrelevant alter-
natives and giva another explanation to the behavior of the consumer ordering
his meal. We could admit that the conscious agent preferences are ranked in
the following order : Fish  Beef  Chicken. When beef and chicken are
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suggested, his rational choice would be to choose beef rst, and sh when it is
suggested. However the unconscious agent may have other views on the mat-
ter. He may consider that hidding his favorite choice is optimal : under this
assumption, when two options exist, chicken is optimal. When sh is suggested,
beef becomes optimal, being an equilibrium between the two agents preferences.
We can of course not prove this assertion for a particular individual. Yet it is
characteristic of our approach.
More generally, this set up provides a rst step towards introducing multi-
rationnality to describe neural processes and choice formation. If automatic
processes, such as motor control, can be described by a utility set up including
some kind of forecasting, more complex processes could well be described by
the interaction of autonomous and possibly strategic structures. This view
ts relatively well with two recent approaches in neurosciences: the cognitive
unconscious, and the complex system approach, namely the cooperative and
"self-assembly" view of the mind.
Moreover, our set up of interactions raises the question of an e¤ective unity of
the individual. It also questions the aggregation of structures over time. We may
wonder if interacting structures can learn from each other to reach a cooperative
equilibrium. This question will be left for further research.
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7 Appendix A. Form of the parameters.
We compute ESi;tPi (t+ n),.Si s expectation at time t, given the expression for
Pi (t+ n):
Pi (t+ n) =
X
j 6=i
F i;j (t+ n)Xj (t+ n  1) + F i;ext (t+ n)Pext (t+ n)
ad thus
ESi;tPi (t+ n) = ESi;t
X
j 6=i
F i;j (t+ n)Xj (t+ n  1)+ESi;tF i;ext (t+ n)Pext (t+ n)
Using Sj s solution to the optimization problem, i.e. Xj (t) = DjPj (t), for
j 6= i; leads to:
ESi;tPi (t+ n) = ESi;t
X
j 6=i
F i;j (t+ n)DjPj (t+ n  1) + ESi;tF i;ext (t+ n)Pext (t+ n)
=
X
j 6=i
F i;j (t+ n)DjESi;tPj (t+ n  1) + ESi;tF i;ext (t+ n)Pext (t+ n)
On the other hand, we now need Pj (t+ n  1) for j 6= i. It si given by:
ESi;tPj (t+ n) = ESi;t
X
k 6=j
F j;k (t+ n)Xk (t+ n  1)+F j;ext (t+ n)Pext (t+ n)
Using again the non strategic agents optimization Xk (t) = DkPk (t) for k 6= i
ESi;tPj (t+ n) =
X
k 6=j;k 6=i
F j;k (t)DkESi;tPk (t+ n  1)
+F j;i (t)ESi;tXi (t+ n  1) + ESi;tF j;ext (t+ n)Pext (t+ n)
leads to
ESi;t (P (t+ n)) = ESi;tM (P (t+ n  1))+V ESi;tXi (t+ n  1)+ESj;tWESj;tPext (t+ n)
with Mj;k = F j;k (t) (1  i;k)Dk for j 6= i and Mi;j = F i;j (t)Dj and Vj =
F j;i (t) ijF i;i (t),Wj = F j;ext (t). This allows to nd ultimately ESi;t (P (t+ n))
and ESi;tPi (t+ n). First:
ESi;t (P (t+ n)) =M
n (P (t))+
nX
l=1
M l 1ESi;t (V Xi (t+ n  l) +WPext (t+ n+ 1  l))
and projecting on Si space yields:
ESi;tPi (t+ n) = iM
n (P (t))+i
nX
l=1
M l 1ESi;t (V Xi (t+ n  l) +WPext (t+ n+ 1  l))
where i is the projection operator on agent i space.
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8 Appendix B. Optimization problem
The optimization problem for the strategic agent Si.is :
0 = ESi;t
@
@Xi (t)
0@X
n0
ni Vi (t+ n)
1A
= ESi;t
0@X
n1
ni
@Pi (t+ n)
@Xi (t)
(BiXi (t+ n)  CiPi (t+ n))
1A AiXi (t) +BiPi (t)
Using the expression for @Pi(t+n)@Xi(t) in the text leads to the following equation:
0 = ESi;ti
0@X
n1
i (iM)
n 1
V (BiXi (t+ n)  CiPi (t+ n))
1A AiXi (t)+BiPi (t)
(9)
All Si forecasts at time t can be built from (P (t)). Morevover Si s optimiza-
tion problem at time t does not depend on past actions :. at each period, the
past is unaccounted for. The situation is reset to 0. Ultimately, all equations in
our problem are linear. Consequently, Si will linearly choose Xi (t) as a linear
function of (P (t)) : Xi (t) = Gi (P (t)).
To nd Gi, we rst replace Xi (t) in ESi;t (P (t+ n)):
ESi;t (P (t+ n)) = ESi;tM (P (t+ n  1))
+V ESi;tXi (t+ n  1) +WESi;tPext (t+ n)
= ESi;t (M + V Gi) (P (t+ n  1)) +WESi;tPext (t+ n)
This is solved recursively to yield:
ESi;t (P (t+ n)) = (M + V Gi)
n
(P (t)) (10)
+ESi;t
nX
l=1
(M + V Gi)
l 1
WPext (t+ n+ 1  l) (11)
Tunring back to the optimization equation and introducing 10 in 9 gives:
0 = i
0@X
n1
i (iM)
n 1
V (BiGi   Cii)

(M + V Gi)
n
+Mextn

(P (t))
1A
 AiXi (t) +BiPi (t)
whereMextn =
Pn
l=1 (M + V Gi)
l 1
WF extt;t+n
ext and ext is the projector send-
ing (P (t)) on Pext (t).
Isolating Xi (t) is straightforward
Xi (t) = DiPi (t) + ii
 1X
n=0
(iM)
n
V (BiGi   Cii) (M + V Gi)n+1
!
(P (t))
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and yields, after identication with Gi (P (t)):
Gi = Dii + ii
 1X
n=0
(iM)
n
V (BiGi   Cii)

(M + V Gi)
n+1
+Mextn+1
!
as claimed in the text.
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9 Appendix C. The strategic agent in the 2 struc-
ture model
The vector (P (t)) is three dimensional, since:
(P (t)) =

P1 (t)
P2 (t)

=
0@ a0a2 (t)
a1 (t)
1A.
Thus, the optimal action a2 (t) = G2 (P (t)) encompasses three parameters.
We therefore let G2 =
 
a b c

.
We rst nd (a; b; c) : using the parameters values as dened in the text
yields the matrices needed for the identication of G2 .
B2 = D2 = ;C2 = ;D1 =
 
1  1 
V =
0@ 01
0
1A ;2 =   0 0 1  ;M =
0@ 0 0 00 0 0
1  1 0
1A
M + V G2 =
0@ 0 0 0a b c
1  1 0
1A , V (B2G2   C22) =
0@ 0 0 0a b c  
0 0 0
1A
F extt;t+n
ext =
0@ 1 0 00 0 0
0 0 0
1A , Mextn = 1  (M + V G2)n1  (M + V G2) F extt;t+next
Note that (iM)
n
= 0 for n  2.
Replacing these matrices in the equation dening G2
G2 = D22+22
 1X
n=0
(2M)
n
V (B2G2   C22)

(M + V G2)
n+1
+Mextn+1
!
leads to the system of equations for a, b, c:
a = 22 ((1  a) (   c)  b (c+ ab+ a)  a)
b = 22
 
b
 
c  b2  b (   c)
c =   22
 
cb2 + c (   c)
Given that 2  < 0, one can check that there are two solutions for the vector
(a; b; c):
c =
(22+1)
q
(22+1)
2 4(22)
2(22)
, b = 0, a = 
2
2( c)
1+22(+ c)
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Moreover, taking into account c '  for 2 ! 0, the solution is :
a =
q 
22 + 1
2   4222 + 22   1q 
22 + 1
2   4222 + 222 +  22 + 1
b = 0
c =
 
22 + 1
 q 22 + 12   4  22
2
 
22

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